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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF MARSHALL
DONNIE DOLLAR.
Petitioner-Defendant-,
Appellant,
v.
MAYOR PETER PAYOFF,
Respondent-PlaintiffAppellee.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2011-CV-1001

BENCH MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
Donnie Dollar is appealing a reversal of a trial court order granting
summary judgment in his favor in Mayor Peter Payoff’s lawsuit based
upon an internet posting of a law school lecture about Payoff. Payoff
alleges that Dollar is liable for, inter alia, violations of the Marshall
State Eavesdropping Statute, tortious interference with a contractual relation, and public disclosure of private facts.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Payoff’s complaint, filed in the Marshall County Circuit Court, alleged violations of the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute, tortious
interference with a contractual relation, and public disclosure of private
facts. Following discovery, Dollar moved for summary judgment on all
three counts. The circuit court granted Dollar’s motion as to all three
counts. Payoff appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which reversed the circuit court’s order. The court of appeals reversed summary
judgment as to the violation of the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute 75 MSC §25-1 because it found that a classroom discussion qualifies
as a conversation under the statute. The court reversed summary judgment as to the tortious interference with contractual relations claim because it found that Dollar’s intent is a question of fact for a jury. The
court reversed as to the publication of private facts on the basis that Payoff is entitled to some privacy regarding his mental health, despite his
fame.
Dollar then petitioned for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Marshall. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal the reversal of
the summary judgment order on all three counts.
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III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Marshall State University Law Center Student Handbook has a
section relating to recording of classes. Section 14 states:
Any student, faculty member, or administrator wishing to record any
class or portion of a class must first obtain the permission of the instructor or any party teaching or conducting a presentation in class
prior to the recording for each class session or portion of a class session.
Such party does not have to be directly employed by Marshall State
University Law Center. Students found in violation of this section will
be dealt with by the Marshall State University Disciplinary Board in
compliance with Section 25 of this handbook.

The Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute, 75 MSC §25-1:
(a) A person commits eavesdropping when they:
(1) Knowingly and intentionally use an eavesdropping device for the
purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation or
intercepts, retains, or transcribes electronic communication unless they
do so with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation or electronic communication.
(b) Definitions:
(1) An eavesdropping device is defined as anything used to hear or record a conversation, even if the conversation is conducted in person.
For the purposes of this section, the term conversation means any oral
communication between 2 (two) or more persons regardless of whether
one or more of the parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that expectation.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term electronic communication
means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio,
pager, computer, electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system, where the sending and receiving parties intend the electronic communication to be private and the interception, recording, or
transcription of the electronic communication is accomplished by a device in a surreptitious manner contrary to the provisions of this Article.
(c) Civil remedies to injured parties.
(1) Any or all parties to any conversation upon which eavesdropping is
practiced contrary to this section shall be entitled to the following
remedies:
(a) To an injunction by the circuit court prohibiting further eavesdropping by the eavesdropper and by or on behalf of their principal, or
either;
(b) To all actual damages against the eavesdropper or their principal or
both;
(c) To any punitive damages which may be awarded by the court or by a
jury.
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties have stipulated that the court of appeals decision shall
serve as the record on appeal. The court of appeals decision1 sets forth
the facts of the case as follows:
The Marshall State University Law Center is located in Marshall
City, which is the capital of Marshall State. Marshall City has approximately two million residents. The law school has approximately 1,500
law students and eighty full time faculty members. In addition to the
full time faculty, the school also employs a number of adjunct faculty
members. These adjunct professors are experienced attorneys who teach
in their area of practice. The adjuncts are not employees of the law
school, but instead are contract employees. The adjunct’s contract runs
the length of one semester. The adjuncts must sign a new contract at the
start of each semester.
Marshall State University Law Center has an extensive student
handbook that sets forth the policies and procedures of the law school.
Each student receives a copy of the handbook during student orientation.
Although they receive a copy of the handbook, the students are not required to sign anything attesting that they have read all the policies and
are required to comply with the polices stated in the handbook. Section
14 of the handbook discusses the recording of lectures at the school. This
policy is clearly set forth in the handbook for each student, because the
State of Marshall has a very strict eavesdropping statute.
Charlie Cheatem is a criminal defense attorney and an alumnus of
Marshall State University Law Center. Cheatem gives back to the
school by teaching as an adjunct professor of law. Cheatem teaches advanced trial advocacy as he is a highly skilled trial attorney. He has won
many favorable outcomes for his high profile clients throughout the
years.
Peter Payoff is the former Mayor of Marshall City. Payoff is also an
alumnus of the Marshall State University Law Center. After passing the
bar, he entered private practice for several years before marrying the
daughter of a prominent City Councilman. Payoff then began climbing
the political ladder at City Hall. Mayor Payoff has been married to his
wife, Priscilla, for the past thirty years. Payoff has always spoken of his
strong marriage and family values while on the campaign trail. Mayor
Payoff always prided himself on the fact that he had never ended up on
the wrong side of the law, not even receiving a parking ticket. Mayor
Payoff literally was a boy scout, having received his Eagle Award for de1. R. at 3-12. The remainder of the Statement of Facts presented here is set forth
verbatim as it appears in the court of appeals decision; the footnotes have been
renumbered.
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veloping a system of delivering meals to the homebound elderly of
Marshall.
While in office, Mayor Payoff drew a hard line on any sort of theft,
including theft of office supplies. He once demoted a fire department captain to lieutenant for allowing firefighters to drive a fire truck to the
grocery store, saying that it amounted to theft of city owned fuel. Additionally, he had a very public spat with the president of the police union
because he felt that officers who accepted discounted coffee and meals
from local businesses amounted to theft by undue use of authority.
Shortly after Mayor Payoff left office one year ago, he was indicted in
the Circuit Court of Marshall County stemming from alleged corruption
during his nearly twenty-five years in office. Mayor Payoff had allegedly
exerted undue influence with the city’s licensing and regulation committee on behalf of one of his friends, in that Payoff allegedly illegally pressured the committee to approve a building permit for his friend and
developer Tim Borland. It appeared as though the mayor used his position to inappropriately aid a long time friend and campaign donor.
Subsequent to leaving office, Mayor Payoff was arrested in a predawn raid on his home. The media photographed Payoff in his jogging
suit and handcuffs as sheriff’s deputies escorted him out of his home.
Due to his notoriety and the nature of his alleged crimes, the judge allowed Mayor Payoff free on bond while awaiting trial. In fact, Mayor
Payoff had made a celebrity of himself in the media during the pre-trial
publicity. He granted every interview request from any reporter that
wanted to talk to him. Mayor Payoff repeatedly told the reporters that
he was an honest mayor and that the evidence would prove his innocence. He even repeatedly told the media that he would testify at his
trial in his own defense.
As a result of the pretrial publicity, Mayor Payoff signed a contract
to appear on the reality show of billionaire Ronald Crump. The contract
included a morals clause stating the contract would be null and void if
Mayor Payoff is found to be engaged in, or has been engaged in, any immoral conduct not disclosed to the producers. The producers knew of the
current allegations against him, but believed Mayor Payoff was innocent
and he would be exonerated at trial. The current corruption charges
were specifically excluded from the morals clause in the contract. After
the Crump contract was signed, Sensational Press Publications and
Mayor Payoff signed a contract to write and publish Mayor Payoff’s biography. Because the publisher considered the publicity from the reality
show to be necessary for the book’s successful publication, completion of
the reality show was a condition of the book’s publication. Mayor Payoff
agreed to these contract terms because he no longer had a source of income to provide for his family due to the fact his pension payments were
being withheld pending resolution of the criminal charges. News of
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Mayor Payoff’s indictment, arrest, and these contracts made national
headlines.
Charlie Cheatem agreed to represent Mayor Payoff. As a matter of
course, Cheatem and Mayor Payoff signed the standard engagement letter that Cheatem gives to all his clients. This engagement letter contained standard provisions regarding confidentiality of information that
Mayor Payoff told Cheatem. This provision was in accordance with the
disciplinary rules governing attorneys in the State of Marshall.
Cheatem and Payoff met many times to discuss the case and the
strategy Mayor Payoff’s defense team would take at trial. Mayor Payoff
told Cheatem, in confidence, he was worried certain information regarding his mental health disorder, kleptomania, would be discovered. When
Cheatem inquired, Mayor Payoff told him that during his entire life he
struggled with kleptomania. He could not keep his hands off Pete Rose
Baseball cards. Every time he went to a card store he would steal Pete
Rose baseball cards. Some were worth pennies and others, like a mint
condition 1963 Topps rookie card could sell for thousands of dollars.
Mayor Payoff told Cheatem that he had been seeking counseling for this
condition at the University of Marshall Hospital. Cheatem told Mayor
Payoff not to worry because such information was protected by attorneyclient privilege.
Mayor Payoff’s trial commenced at the Criminal Courts Building in
the Circuit Court of Marshall County. The start of the case coincided
with Spring Semester of Marshall State University Law Center.
Cheatem decided he could use this case as a teaching tool for his Advanced Trial Advocacy students. He would often use what happened in
the courtroom to teach his class at night. The trial lasted nearly two
months and received daily media attention. Every day of the trial the
former mayor stood in front of the media and professed his innocence.
He even went so far as to say he was going to testify. At the end of the
state’s case in chief, the defense, led by Charlie Cheatem presented its
case. In the end, Mayor Payoff decided not to testify, in part because he
did not want to answer questions and partly on the advice of his counsel.
The jury returned without a unanimous verdict, which was required for
conviction under the Marshall State Criminal Code. After five days of
the jury being deadlocked, the judge declared a hung jury. The defense
team took this as a victory, but the state promised to retry Mayor Payoff
at the earliest possible time.
Cheatem was scheduled to teach his Advanced Trial Advocacy class
at the Marshall State University Law Center the day the jury came back
without a decision. Prior to teaching his class, Cheatem and Payoff went
to celebrate at a local establishment. After a few drinks, Cheatem invited Payoff to his class to meet his students. Payoff happily agreed.
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Cheatem began class at six o’clock by introducing Mayor Payoff.
Mayor Payoff informed the class of the jury’s decision and then discussed
some of the trial strategies, including Cheatem’s decision not to have
Payoff take the stand. Payoff told the students that he really wanted to
testify especially since he had promised the media and the people of Marshall City, but Cheatem had advised him that it is generally a very bad
idea for a defendant to testify in his own defense.
On the day in question, Donnie Dollar, a student in Cheatem’s Advanced Trial Advocacy class missed the first few minutes of class and did
not want to interrupt Mayor Payoff by asking Professor Cheatem for permission to record the class. Dollar assumed that it would be alright to
record the class, because Cheatem had generally granted permission to
any student who wanted to record a class. Dollar slipped into his seat,
pulled out his mini-recorder, and began recording class. The recording
began just as Mayor Payoff was talking about not testifying in his own
behalf. After 45 minutes, Mayor Payoff finished discussing the trial and
thanked Cheatem for all his hard work. With the Mayor’s departure
from class, Cheatem dismissed the class for its break.
Donnie Dollar was excited he had not missed Mayor Payoff’s discussion because he came from a well-known, politically influential family
from Marshall County. His father, Dudley Dollar was the head of the
Donkey Committee, the political party that opposes the former Mayor.
Donnie Dollar, an average student, wanted to prove to his father that he
was worthy of the family’s fortunes. Donnie Dollar’s brother, David, was
also quite politically active. David published a blog on the politics of
Marshall and a few weeks back, he had a blog post discussing his concern about Payoff’s book and TV deals. A few hours after David published the aforementioned blog post, Donnie posted a comment to his
brother’s blog about the TV and book deals, stating, “Payoff is going to
make a fortune by talking about his crooked life. Someone should really
stop these deals from happening.”
Upon returning to the classroom, Cheatem called class to order and
began discussing Payoff’s decision not to testify in his own behalf.
Cheatem reiterated that “one important reason defendants should not
testify is because it can open the door to embarrassing questions about
personal matters, mental disorders, and other potentially prejudicial material.” A student in the front row asked Cheatem what he meant exactly. Cheatem went on to explain that, “for example, if it was revealed
that a defendant had the mental disorder kleptomania, it could be extremely prejudicial, especially in cases involving fraud and dishonesty.”
Shortly thereafter, Cheatem, realizing he should not have said anything
about kleptomania in his lecture, concluded class.
Dollar decided to place the recording of the lecture on the school’s
webpage for the Advanced Trial Advocacy class. In addition to posting
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the recording, Dollar commented that, “the reason Payoff did not testify
at his trial was to avoid disclosing that he had the mental disorder kleptomania.” Students had permission to write and post items onto the
school’s website, much like a message board, provided they complied
with The Marshall State University Law Center’s Code of Conduct and
Student Handbook rules. The site could be accessed only by the students
in the Advanced Trial Advocacy class. However, there were no technological safeguards in place by the school to keep the students from taking
the material and posting it on other locations.
Several students who had skipped the class listened to the lecture
and found it very interesting. They began to post comments about the
fact that they could not believe that Mayor Payoff was a thief. In this
discussion string posted on the website, Donnie Dollar stated that the
bribery charges against Mayor Payoff were probably true as the former
Mayor had a problem with stealing. Since Mayor Payoff’s trial was the
talk of the Marshall City legal community, one student linked the recording on the school’s website to his personal SpaceBook page. Once this
lecture recording was posted to the students SpaceBook page, others
posted it to their pages and the national media began playing it in conjunction with coverage of the Mayor’s bribery charges. The recording
was eventually heard by millions of people world-wide. One such person
who heard the recording was Mr. Crump. Pursuant to the morals clause
in the contract Crump had with Payoff, the deal was terminated for
cause. As a result of no longer being on the television show, the book
deal was subsequently cancelled. Mayor Payoff is believed to have lost
out on millions of dollars.
Not only did he lose the contracts with Crump and Sensational Press
Publications, many of Mayor Payoff’s strongest supporters have turned
on him, thinking that a mayor who steals must be corrupt. Through the
discovery process for the second trial of Mayor Payoff, it was determined
that certain witnesses against the former Mayor lied about paying
bribes. The State dropped the bribery charges, but the corruption
charges were reset for trial.
V. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Three issues are raised on appeal: (1) whether the appellate court
erred in reversing summary judgment in Donnie Dollar’s favor on Peter
Payoff’s claim of a violation of the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute; (2) whether the appellate court erred in reversing summary judgment in favor of Donnie Dollar on Peter Payoff’s tortious interference
with contractual relations claim; and (3) whether the appellate court
erred in reversing summary judgment in favor of Donnie Dollar on Peter
Payoff’s claim of public disclosure of private facts.
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is a procedural device that enables a court to
dispose of part or all of a case prior to trial. In the State of Marshall,
summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Marshall Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is proper only if there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.2 The court considers the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in assessing whether summary judgment is proper.3 A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the
[non-moving party] on the evidence presented.”4
An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court.5 The reviewing court determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists by viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party.6 The
moving party has the burden of identifying the material facts which are
without genuine dispute and support the entry of summary judgment in
favor of the moving party.7 The non-moving party, for its part, must
identify which material facts raise genuine issues of dispute.8 Because
the entry of summary judgment “is a drastic means of disposing of litigation,”9 it should be granted only when the moving party’s right to relief is
“clear and free from doubt.”10 However, the mere fact that there exists
“some alleged factual dispute between the parties”11 or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”12 is insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.

2. MARSHALL R. CIV. P. 56(c) (cited at R. 3). Rule 56(c) is similar or identical to the
corresponding provision of the federal rules, FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
4. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
5. Delta Sav. Bank v. U.S., 265 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001).
6. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
7. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
8. Id. at 324.
9. Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ill. 1986).
10. Id.
11. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247 (emphasis omitted).
12. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-1\SFT103.txt

84

unknown

Seq: 10

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

9-AUG-12

10:50

[Vol. XXIX

B. VIOLATION OF MARSHALL STATE EAVESDROPPING
STATUTE 75 MSC §25-1
General
The Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute is located in the Marshall State Code and is attached to the court record above.13 Under the
statute, a person cannot use an eavesdropping device to record all or any
part of a conversation without the consent of all the parties to the conversation.14 The Marshall State Statute is a criminal statute, which provides civil remedies if violated.15 If the act is violated, civil remedies
include an injunction prohibiting further eavesdropping, actual damages, and punitive damages.16
Dollar’s alleged violation of the Eavesdropping Statute
Payoff’s first claim against Dollar alleges that he violated Marshall
State’s eavesdropping statute when failed to ask Cheatem whether it
would be acceptable for him to record that day’s lecture. Under Marshall
State law a person commits eavesdropping when they: “knowingly and
intentionally use an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or
recording all or any part of any conversation. . .unless they do so with the
consent of all the parties to such conversation.”17
Donnie Dollar will likely argue that he did not violate the Eavesdropping Statute and that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
should not have been reversed. Dollar will likely argue that there is no
expectation of privacy in a classroom setting. Additionally, Dollar will
likely argue that the eavesdropping statute does not apply to him because he was a participant in the conversation or classroom discussion
and as such the statute does not apply to him.18
In arguing there is no expectation of privacy in a classroom setting,
Dollar may cite to State v. McLellan. In this case, the defendant was
caught on school surveillance video stealing items.19 The court ruled
that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in a classroom setting
because it was not an area he had exclusive control over.20 “A reasonable expectation of privacy. . .exists in an area given over to an employee’s
13. 75 MSC § 25-1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 75 MSC § 25-1(a)(1).
18. Kipping v. Ill. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 211, 215 (“[t]he Eavesdropping Act
does not govern the recording of a conversation by a party to that conversation; it governs
the taping by an outside party to the conversation.”) (citing People v. Rodriguez, 680
N.E.2d 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)).
19. See State v. McLellan, 744 A.2d. 611, 612-13 (N.H. 1999).
20. Id. at 614.
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exclusive use.”21 As a guest at the school, Payoff did not have exclusive
use over the classroom where the recording occurred. As an adjunct,
Cheatem also did not have exclusive control over the classroom because
he is a contract employee who teaches at the school part-time. The court
in McLellan noted, “the classroom in this case was not an area over
which the defendant enjoyed exclusive use and control. . .the classroom
was an area open to students and staff.”22 Dollar should argue that
since the classroom is an area open to all, Payoff should not have had an
expectation of privacy.
Payoff may counter that McLellan is factually distinguishable from
the facts of the present case. The defendant in McLellan was an employee of the school.23 Payoff on the other hand, was not an employee of
the school and was recorded not by the school, but by a student in the
class.
In arguing that the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute does not
apply to a classroom lecture because it does not qualify as a “conversation” as defined by the statute, Dollar may cite DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak
Park.24 In DeBoer, plaintiff sued the village in part because a village
attorney recorded a rally held in a public space inside of the village
hall.25 Plaintiff alleged that this recording was done without the consent
of the parties in attendance and thus violated the statute. The judge in
DeBoer dismissed the eavesdropping count because the rally failed to
meet the statutory definition of “conversation.” In doing so, the court
reasoned that the statute prohibits the recording of conversations between individuals in attendance at a public event, “not the remarks
made by speakers at such events to those in the audience.”26
Based on DeBoer, Dollar could argue that his recording of the class
section is not covered by the statute and therefore he has no civil liability
for taping the class without asking for permission from the instructor
first. Dollar could argue that Cheatem, as the instructor has the floor
and is the leader of the classroom discussion and that the students in the
lecture are members of an audience there to listen. Therefore, under the
DeBoer Court’s reasoning, the statute would only prohibit the recording
of conversation which might take place among the students who are essentially members of the audience. Since Cheatem was the primary
speaker and the record does not reflect a back and forth amongst the
21. McLellan, 744 A.2d. at 614 (citing United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 671 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
22. McLellan, 744 A.2d. at 614.
23. See generally id.
24. DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 90 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 924.
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students, as defined by the statute a conversation had not taken place.27
Dollar could then argue that Marshall State’s eavesdropping statute
does not apply to his recording of the classroom section because one person speaking to an audience does not create a conversation as defined by
the statute.
Payoff may counter by arguing that a classroom setting leads inherently to the creation of a classroom setting and that the statute should
apply to Dollar’s recording of Cheatem’s lecture. This position is supported by Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No.145, where special education teachers brought a declaratory judgment action against
the school district.28 Under a policy approved by the school district, special education classrooms were recorded.29 The special education teachers did not give their permission to be recorded and argued that the
school board’s policy violated Illinois’s statute against eavesdropping. In
that case, the school district’s main argument was that teaching does not
meet the definition of conversation as defined by the statute and that the
teachers have no expectation of privacy in their classrooms.30 Payoff
could argue that a classroom setting is one which a dialogue between
student and teacher would naturally lead to a conversation in the classroom setting.31 It is important to note, that the Plock Court, in dicta,
made a distinction between classroom interactions between students and
teachers in elementary special education classes and a lecture that
would typically be found on a college campus in a large lecture hall.32
Dollar may counter that the majority’s holding in Plock does not apply to
the current factual scenario because Dollar recorded Cheatem at a university in a large lecture hall setting, the kind of which the court in Plock
distinguished from a special education classroom.

27. Id. (“[a]ll of this comports with our colloquial understanding of ‘conversation’ as
involving an exchange – that is, mutual discourse as opposed to a statement or declaration
by one person alone.”) .
28. Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No. 145, 920 N.E.2d 1087 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 1092.
31. Id. at 1093 (“[a]s properly stated by the trial court, the conduct of ‘teachers imparting knowledge to students and the students asking and answering. . .questions is easily distinguishable from public speeches.”‘).
32. Id. at 1092 (“Specifically, the [school board] argues that teachers must adhere to
specific lessons plans and are not employed to engage in an open-ended verbal give and
take with their students. The speech-like communication that the defendant describes
might occur at a university where a professor delivers a lecture to a large audience of
students.”).
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The Eavesdropping Statute and Privacy Considerations
In determining whether parties intended a conversation to be confidential “calls for a determination as to whether the, ‘circumstances. . .reasonably indicate that any party to such communication
desires it to be confined to such parties,’ or whether the circumstances
are such that ‘the parties to the communication may reasonably expect
that the communication may be. . .recorded.’ ”33 The analysis hinges on
whether the circumstances surrounding the lecture could have led to an
expectation that the conversation would not be recorded. The totality of
the circumstances include the fact that the handbook required teacher
consent to record and the fact that Dollar never asked permission to record the class. Additionally, the lecture was held in a large lecture hall
full of students, where class had regularly been recorded in the past.
Courts have relied on several factors to determine whether a party
had an expectation that his or her oral statements were meant to be kept
private:
(1) the volume of the statements; (2) the proximity of other individuals
to the speaker. . .(3) the potential for the communications to be reported; (4) the actions taken by the speaker to ensure his or her privacy;
(5) the need to employ technological enhancements for one to hear the
speaker’s statements; and (6) the place or location where the statements are made.34

Dollar is likely to argue that Cheatem and Payoff had no expectation
of privacy when he was recorded by Dollar during the classroom lecture.
Dollar will likely argue that as an enrollee in Cheatem’s Advanced Trial
Advocacy class he was a participant, even if only passively listening to
classroom discussions, and as such Cheatem and Payoff had no expectation of privacy between themselves and Dollar. “There can be no expectation of privacy by the declarant where the individual recording the
conversation is a party to that conversation.”35 Dollar will likely argue
that by simply being enrolled in the class and in attendance for lecture
that day, no eavesdropping occurred because he was participating in the
conversation. Dollar may also argue that he was recording the lecture to
create an accurate record of the lecture for him to recall at a later date.36
Dollar could also turn to Deeter v. Angus for the contention that the
circumstances of the classroom lecture would reasonably suggest that
33. Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 471, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
34. State v. Duchow, 749 N.W.2d 913, 920-21 (Wis. 2008).
35. People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 1994). In Herrington, a conversation
between the defendant and the victim was recorded by the Quincy Police Department. Defendant alleged this conversation violated the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute. The appellate court found that no violation had occurred.
36. Id. at 959 (“This recording enabled the [person making the recording] to preserve a
more accurate record of the conversation.”).
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there was no expectation that the conversation in class would be confined to just the parties there.37 Dollar will argue that Payoff should
have reasonably expected that the lecture could have been overheard
and recorded.38 Dollar may also argue that there is a diminished expectation of privacy in a classroom and that Payoff should have expected to
the lecture to be recorded because of that diminished expectation.39
Payoff is likely to argue that regardless of privacy issues, he and
Cheatem did have an expectation against the unauthorized recording of
the classroom lecture. Payoff and Cheatem as the primary speakers during the lecture, took steps to ensure the lecture would not be recorded
and as such would remain private.40 Furthermore, neither consented to
the recording of the lecture as required by the student handbook. Payoff
will likely cite People v. Siwek. In Siwek, the defendant’s phone conversation with a police informant was recorded without his knowledge.41
The Siwek Court noted the eavesdropping protection covered all conversations regardless of whether they were private in nature.42 Payoff may
also turn to Warden v. Kahn, where the court stated that a conversation
should be deemed confidential when one party reasonably believes that
the conversation was intended to stay between the parties.43 Payoff reasonably anticipated that the lecture would stay between just the students in the classroom and not be recorded because no student asked for
permission to record the class. Payoff is likely to argue that even though
the lecture was not intended to be a private conversation, Dollar still
violated the eavesdropping statute because it applies to all conversations, regardless of the nature of the conversation.
Payoff is likely to point to the dissent in People v. Herrington, in
which Justice Bilandic referenced the fact that the majority inappropriately applied the eavesdropping statute. Again, in Herrington, only one
party to a conversation consented to the recording.44 Payoff will likely
argue that Justice Bilandic’s application of the eavesdropping statute is
correct and that all parties to a conversation need to consent before they
can be recorded. Specifically, neither Cheatem nor Payoff explicitly consented to the recording of the conversation, which is required by both
37. Id.
38. Deeter v. Angus, 224 Cal, Rptr. 801, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
39. Duchow, 749 N.W.2d at 922.
40. Id. at 921.
41. People v. Siwek, 671 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
42. Id. at 363 (“The previous version of the eavesdropping statute. . .excluded conversations which a party did not intend to be private.”).
43. Warden, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
44. See Herrington, 645 N.E.2d at 959 (“Pursuant to the plain and clear language of
the statute, the legislature has directed that all parties to a conversation must consent
before recording a conversation. This requirement was not satisfied.”).
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Marshall State Statute and school policy.45 As such, since no one asked
to record the class, per both the statute and school policy, Payoff will
argue that they had an expectation that no one was recording the
conversation.
Implied Consent
Dollar may also argue that Payoff had impliedly consented to the
recording of lecture because he had never refused to allow the recording
of class the entire semester.46 Implied consent has been defined as, “consent exists where a person’s behavior manifests acquiescence or a comparable diminution of his protected rights.”47 The Illinois Supreme Court
elaborated, “the circumstances relevant to an implication of consent will
vary from case to case, but will ordinarily include language or acts that
tend to prove that a party knows of, or assents to, encroachments on the
routine expectation that conversations are private.”48 Dollar will likely
argue that Cheatem’s consent to record the class was implied because he
had never denied anyone the right to record class in the past, which led
Dollar to believe that recording this particular lecture would be no
different.
Dollar will likely point to People v. Ceja, in which the defendants
were recorded over an intercom at a police department to prove his contention that Cheatem had given his implied consent to record the classroom lecture.49 The defendants in Ceja were repeatedly told that they
were being recorded. One of the subjects at the station even said, “Hey,
they can hear what we are saying.”50 At trial, defendants objected to the
presentation of the recording, which was made at the police station. The
Court ruled that the defendant should have been aware that his conversations with his cellmates where being recorded because he had been
repeatedly warned that his conversations were being recorded.51 Dollar,
could also argue that by consenting week after week to being recorded,
Cheatem would have also consented for the lecture in which he was unable to ask permission because of his late arrival.52
45. Id. at 960 (“The defendant here did not expressly or impliedly consent to the recording of his conversation with the alleged victim. . .The defendant was under the assumption that his conversation with the alleged victim was private.”).
46. See R. at 6 (“Dollar assumed it would be alright to record the class, because
Cheatem had generally granted permission to any student who wanted to record a class.”).
47. People v. Ceja, 789 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 2003) (citing Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d
112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990)).
48. Id. at 1241.
49. See generally id.
50. Id. at 1237.
51. Id. at 1241 (“We cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred in concluding that
defendant was aware that his statements were electronically monitored.”).
52. See R. at 6 for contention that Dollar arrived to Lecture late.
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Payoff will likely counter by arguing that he did in fact have an expectation that class would not be recorded and that his consent would
always have to be given prior to recording of class per the provision in
the student handbook. Payoff will argue that he could never impliedly
consent to a recording of classroom lecture because the law school’s manual explicitly requires consent by the instructor prior to recording a
classroom lecture.53 Cheatem had not given permission to Dollar to record the class. To argue this point, Payoff will likely point to Shefts v.
Petrakis, a case in which the company the plaintiff was working for had
an employee manual and policy in place which allowed for management
to monitor use of the company’s email system.54 In that case, the court
ruled that because the plaintiff knew the contents of the employee manual, which allowed authorized personnel to view employee email, that he
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Illinois
Eavesdropping Statute.55 Payoff will also likely rely on State v. DuBray.
In DuBray, the defendant was a prisoner at a federal prison in Montana.56 The defendant argued phone conversations should not have been
used at his trial because they violated state eavesdropping laws.57 Upon
entering the prison the defendant was given a handbook informing him
that his phone conversations were subject to recording.58 He signed a
page acknowledging he understood what was in the handbook.59 The
court ruled that the defendant was aware the conversations were subject
to monitoring because of the handbook.60 Payoff will likely argue that
the Marshall State Law Center had a policy in place which required permission from the instructor before a classroom discussion could be recorded. Payoff will argue that Cheatem could not have impliedly
consented because under the policy of the law school implied consent
could not be granted. An instructor had to explicitly consent each and
every lecture. Cheatem had not consented and as such the Marshall
State Eavesdropping Statute was violated.
53. R. at Appendix A. “Any student, faculty member, or administrator wishing to record any class or portion of a class must first obtain the permission of the instructor or any
party teaching or conducting a presentation in class prior to the recording for each class
session.” Id. This is found in Section 14 of the Marshall State University law Center Student Handbook.
54. Shefts v. Petrakis et al., No. 10-cv-1104, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129974, at *6 (C.D.
Ill. Dec. 8 2010).
55. Id. at *33 (“The Court finds that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications after the manual went into effect.”).
56. State v. Dubray, 77 P.3d 247, 252 (Mont. 2003).
57. See id. at 253.
58. See id. at 263.
59. See id.
60. Id. “We hold that because [the defendant] was aware that his telephone conversations were subject to monitoring and recording no [violation of the eavesdropping statute]. . .occurred.” Id.
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C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
Payoff’s second claim alleges that Dollar is liable for tortious interference with contractual relations. To succeed on his claim, Payoff must
prove five elements: 1) a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third
person which confers upon the plaintiff a contractual right against a
third person; 2) the defendant knows of the contract; 3) the defendant
intentionally induces the third-party not to perform the contract; 4) and
in doing so acts without justification; and 5) resulting in actual damage
to the plaintiff.61 A tortious interference with contractual relations
cause of action recognizes that a person’s business relationship is a property interest which is entitled to protection from unjustified tampering.62
Payoff’s claim is based on his contracts with Ronald Crump and Sensational Press Publications.
The circuit court granted summary judgment against Payoff on the
basis that Dollar did not have the requisite intent to interfere with the
contract when he gave truthful information.63 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court finding that the truthfulness of the statement
does not bear on the intent of the defendant.64 Specifically, the court
held that intent is a question of fact that a jury is to decide.65
Existence of Valid Contract
The first element of the tort is the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a
contractual right against a third person.66 A “valid contract” is a contract that is fully operative in accordance with the parties’ intent.67 A
valid contract is created by: (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance; (3) a meeting
of the minds; (4) mutual consent to the terms by both parties; and (5)
execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual
61. Gupton v. Son-Lan Dev. Co., 695 S.E.2d 763, 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979):
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing
or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of
the third person to perform the contract.
62. Allstar Music, Inc. v. Eckhoff, 629 N.E.2d 816, 821-22 (Ill. App. 1994).
63. See R. at 10, relying on Miller v. Lockport Realty Grp., Inc., 878 N.E.2d 171, 179
(Ill. App. 2007) (“There is no liability for interference with a contractual relation on the
part of one who merely gives truthful information.”).
64. See R. at 11.
65. R. at 11.
66. Gupton, 695 S.E.2d at 770.
67. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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and binding.68 Execution and delivery are not always required because
a party may accept a contract, and indicate its intent to be bound to the
terms, by acts and conduct in accordance with the terms.69
Dollar is likely to argue that the contracts between Payoff, Crump
and Sensational Press are not valid contracts. He is likely to argue that
the contracts were not valid from their creation because Payoff’s conduct,
namely his kleptomania, was not conduct in accordance with the terms
of the contract.70 The morals clause of the Crump contract specifically
stated that the contract would be “null and void if Mayor Payoff was
found to be engaged in, or has been engaged in, any immoral conduct not
disclosed to the producers.”71 “Kleptomania” is an impulse control disorder where the sufferer is unable to resist urges and impulses.72 It is a
crime to steal. Because Payoff engaged in and has been engaged in immoral conduct, the contracts were not valid upon their creation.
Payoff is likely to argue that the contracts are valid. He will argue
there was an offer, acceptance, a meeting of the minds and mutual consent to the terms. He will also rely on the fact that the Marshall Court of
Appeals held that “[t]here is no doubt that there were two valid and enforceable contracts in this matter.”73
Defendant’s Knowledge of the Contract
In order to be liable for tortious interference with contractual relations, the defendant must have had knowledge of the contract.74 A defendant need not have specific details of the business arrangement or
relationship in order to sustain a cause of action.75 The plaintiff may
show that the defendant had knowledge of facts or information that,
upon further reasonable inquiry, would have led that defendant to discover the existence of a business expectancy.76 Intentional interference
68. Prime Prod., Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 631, 636 (Tex. App. 2002).
69. Augusta Dev. Co. v. Fish Oil Well Serv. Co., Inc., 761 S.W.2d 538, 544 (Tex. App.
1988).
70. Id.
71. See R. at 5.
72. See Mental Health Illnesses, WEBMD.COM, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/
mental-health-types-illness (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
73. See R. at 10.
74. Gupton, 695 S.E.2d at 770.
75. Malatesta v. Leichter, 542 N.E.2d 768, 780-81 (Ill. App. 1989).
76. Id.; see also Cont’l Research, Inc. v. Cruttenden, Podesta, & Miller, 222 F. Supp.
190, 199 (D. Minn. 1963) (“It is enough to show that defendant had knowledge of facts
which, if followed by reasonable inquiry, would have led to a complete disclosure of the
contractual relations and rights of the parties.”), and Guice v. Sentinel Tech., Inc., 689
N.E.2d 355, 364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“[F]or purposes of setting forth a cause of action for
intentional interference with contract, the plaintiff need only allege knowledge by [the defendant] of the [contract].The [exact] date upon which such knowledge was acquired by [the
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“presupposes knowledge of the plaintiff’s interests, or at least of facts
which would lead a reasonable man to believe in their existence.”77
Dollar is not likely to contest knowledge of the contracts. His own
words show he had at least some knowledge of them. He could claim
that he only heard about them second hand. He could also claim that he
had no idea there was a morals clause or of the terms of the contracts.
He could argue that his lack of knowledge of what would terminate the
contract could not make his actions in intentional inducement to breach
them.
Payoff is likely to claim that Dollar had knowledge of the contracts
because he posted about them on David Dollar’s Blog.78 Specifically Dollar stated, “Payoff is going to make a fortune by talking about his
crooked life. Someone should really stop these deals from happening.”79
Payoff will claim these statements would lead a reasonable man to believe Dollar knew of the existence of the contracts.
Defendant’s Intentional Inducement of the Third Party Not to Perform
the Contract
a.

Intent

The third element of tortious interference with contractual relations
is intentional inducement of the third-party not to perform the contract.80 A defendant can act with the necessary intent by either acting
for the primary purposes of interfering with the contract, desiring to interfere while acting for some other reason, or where the defendant knows
that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action.81 In addition, interference must be improper. Even
though an actor may know that interference will result, if the primary
purpose of the conduct is legitimate, then the conduct may not be
defendant] is irrelevant, provided acquisition of that knowledge preceded the alleged conduct of interference.”).
77. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 129, 941 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1977).
78. R. at 6.
79. Id.
80. Gupton, 695 S.E.2d at 770.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. j (1979); Neider v. Franklin, 844 So.2d
433, 437 (Miss. 2003) (A showing of specific intent is not required to support a claim of
tortious interference with contractual relations; “rather, intent can be inferred when a defendant knows a contract exists between two parties and does a wrongful act that he is
certain or reasonably certain will interfere with the contract.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §8A (1977):
The word “intent” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote
that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.
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actionable.82
Dollar may argue that he was not “substantially certain” his actions
would result in Payoff’s contracts being terminated. He could argue that
he had no knowledge of the morals clause, which was what ultimately
terminated the contract.83 He might also rely on the trial court’s finding
that the statements were truthful and he cannot be held liable under
Miller v. Lockport Realty Group, Inc.84 He could also argue that his
statements that went along with the web-post of the lecture were opinions and not fact, thereby making the purpose of his actions legitimate.85
He could also argue that he was justified in posting the lecture on-line
because the public has a right to know of Payoff’s indiscretions.
Payoff may claim that Dollar’s posting of the lecture and his statements amount to fraudulent representation. “Fraudulent representation” exists when, to knowledge or belief of its utterer, representation is
false in a sense in which it is intended to be understood by recipient.86
Payoff may further claim that the lecture alone was not harmful since
Cheatem only talked in generalities, and he never specifically stated that
Payoff has a mental disorder. Payoff will contend it was the statement
made by Dollar, “the reason Payoff did not testify at his trial was to avoid
disclosing that he had the mental disorder kleptomania.”87 He may also
claim this statement was meant for the world to believe he was a kleptomaniac. He will try to negate Dollar’s use of Miller v. Lockport Realty
Group, Inc. by claiming that the statement, although truthful, was not
known to be true by anyone but his attorney Cheatem and that what
Cheatem knew was held private under the attorney-client privilege.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979):
In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct,
(b) the actor’s motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
83. See R. at 7.
84. Miller, 878 N.E.2d at 179.
85. Soderlund Bros., Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 663 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“Matters of fact are distinguishable from expressions of opinion . . .”); see PROSSER & KEATON ON
TORTS § 128, 968 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, David G. Owens eds.,
5th ed. 1984) (“[A] number of cases have subscribed to the view that opinion statements of
competitors are not actionable”).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (1979); see also Miller, 878 N.E.2d at
179.
87. R. at 7.
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Causation

As part of the burden to prove intent on behalf of the defendant, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s actions actually caused an interference with a contractual relation.88 In Meyers v. Levy, the plaintiff,
a high school football coach, alleged the defendant, a parent, made disparaging remarks about him in a petition for his removal to the superintendent, and he was ultimately terminated as coach; however, plaintiff
failed to rebut the uncontroverted testimony of the superintendent that
the decision to terminate was not made by the petition, but because of
the defendants drug problem.89 The court of appeals affirmed the entry
of summary judgment on the interference claim because there was no
evidence to support causation.90
Dollar will likely argue that he did not cause the contracts to be terminated. He will argue that he simply posted the lecture for his classmates and his statements were opinions not meant to induce a
termination of the contracts. Dollar will claim that the fact that another
student took his post and placed it on SpaceBook was an unexpected act
of a third party that would relieve him of any causation.91
Payoff will likely argue that but for Dollar’s post of the lecture and
statements online, Crump and Sensational Press would have no reason
to terminate their contracts with him. There was no mention in the record that Payoff disclosed to anyone other than Cheatem about his
mental disorder. Cheatem’s statements by themselves do not claim that
Payoff was a kleptomaniac. The statements were generalizations. It
was Dollar’s linking the lecture with the claim that Payoff had kleptomania that set the ball rolling for causation.
c.

Damages

In order to prevail on a claim for intentional interference with a contractual relation the plaintiff must prove actual damage.92 Even where
88. See Meyers v. Levy, 808 N.E.2d 1139, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); see also Ventas, Inc.
v. HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 313 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that under Kentucky law, plaintiff
alleging tortious interference with prospective contractual relation must show that defendant’s improper interference was the but-for cause of plaintiff’s injury).
89. Meyers, 808 N.E.2d at 1153.
90. Id. at 1153-54.
91. See R. at 7. One student linked the recording from the school’s website to his personal SpaceBook page.
92. Gupton, 695 S.E.2d at 770; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (1979):
(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective
contractual relation is liable for damages for
(a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract or the prospective relation;
(b) consequential losses for which the interference is a legal cause; and
(c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably to be
expected to result from the interference.
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the defendant’s improper conduct caused inconvenience, the plaintiff
must show consequential loss or damage to satisfy this element.93
Dollar will likely argue that there was no guarantee of payment. He
will likely argue that the contracts were at-will and could have been terminated at anytime.94 He will argue Payoff cannot prove he was entitled
to the benefits of the contract without performance. Performance was
due at a later date, mainly the conclusion of his criminal trial. He will
argue there are too many variables to negate payment of the contract
and therefore, Payoff cannot prove damages. Alternatively, Dollar could
argue that if the Court is convinced that damages have been incurred
but the amount cannot be proved with reasonable certainty, it should
award nominal damages.95
Payoff will likely argue that he is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages.96 He will argue that he should be entitled to the loss of
profits to be made out of the expected contracts.97 Payoff will claim the
contract is not an at-will employer/employee contract but he is an independent contractor.98 He will argue that these contracts were terminated because of Dollar and that he has been monetarily damaged
because of Dollar’s actions. He will also argue he is entitled to damages
(2) In an action for interference with a contract by inducing or causing a third
person to break the contract with the other, the fact that the third person is liable
for the breach does not affect the amount of damages awardable against the actor;
but any damages in fact paid by the third person will reduce the damages actually
recoverable on the judgment.
93. See Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 33,
38 (Ill. App. 1989).
94. See Kerr v. Johns Hopkins University, No. L–10–3294, 2011 WL 4072437 *4 (D.
Md., 2011) (An at-will contract means that an employee can be terminated or disciplined
“for any reason, even a reason that is arbitrary, capricious, or fundamentally unfair.”) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1979) (The fact that the contract is terminable at will, however, is to be taken into account in determining the damages that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of its breach).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. c (1979).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(b) (1979).
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. b (1979):
In the case in which a third person is prevented from performing a contract with
the plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover for the loss of profits from the contract.
When it is the plaintiff himself who is prevented from performance of his contract
with a third person, he may recover for expenses to which he is put or for other
pecuniary losses incurred in making his performance good. And when the defendant’s interference is with prospective contractual relations, the plaintiff may recover for the loss of profits to be made out of the expected contracts.
98. See Ross v. Ninety-Two West, Ltd., 412 S.E.2d 876, 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (to
determine relationships in a contract for performance the test is whether the contract
gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing work as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in
conformity to the contract.).
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for his emotional distress and harm to reputation.99
D. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS
Payoff’s third claim is for public disclosure of private facts. To sustain an action for public disclosure of private facts a plaintiff must show:
(1) public disclosure; (2) of a private fact; (3) which would be offensive
and objectionable to the reasonable person; and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.100 Dollar’s claim is based on the fact that his
mental disorder, Kleptomania, was disclosed by Dollar on the internet.
The circuit court granted summary judgment against Mayor Payoff
on this claim. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court ruling finding that Payoff is entitled to some privacy rights despite his fame and the
fact that he sought help for his mental disorder is not of legitimate
concern.101
Public Disclosure
Public disclosure may consist of a communication made to a large or
potentially large number of persons, or a communication made to a particular group of persons, even if that group is not objectively large when
the plaintiff has a “special relationship” with this group.102 It is not an
invasion of privacy to communicate a fact concerning one’s private life to
a single person or even to a small group of persons.103 On the other
hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any
broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large
audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the
term.104 So long as the nature of the publicity ensures that it would
reach the public, there is publicity.105 The publicity element of an inva99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(c) (1979).
100. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977):
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
101. See R. at 11.
102. Cordts v. Chicago Tribune Co., 860 N.E.2d 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (generally, to
satisfy the publicity element of the tort, plaintiff must show that information was disclosed
to public at large; however, publicity requirement may be satisfied when disclosure is made
to small number of people who have “special relationship” with plaintiff); Olson v. Red
Cedar Clinic, 681 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Wis. App. Ct 2004).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
104. Id.
105. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 588 (D.C.1985).
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sion of privacy claim is satisfied when private information is posted on a
publicly accessible Internet Web site.106 Determination that publicity
occurred does not require a large actual audience and does not depend on
whether the content offered through the medium is of general interest to
the public, but rather on whether the content is conveyed through a medium that delivers the information directly to the public.107
Here, Cheatem’s lecture was posted to the school’s webpage for the
Trial Advocacy Class by Dollar.108 In addition to posting the recording,
Dollar commented that, “the reason payoff did not testify at his trial was
to avoid disclosing that he had the mental disorder kleptomania.”109
Several students listened to the lecture and began posting comments
about the Mayor being a thief.110 Dollar noted on the discussion board
that the bribery charges against the mayor were probably true because
he has a stealing problem.111 Another student in the class copied the
lecture to his SpaceBook page and it was then transmitted worldwide.112
Dollar may argue that the posting on the school’s web-site was not
publicity because the school website was not accessible to the public at
large. He may rely on Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., where the
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that a trucking company that had
distributed names and social security numbers of 204 employees to its
terminal managers via facsimile did not constitute publication, as required to establish invasion of privacy.113 The court found that the dissemination to managers of the company by fax was not substantial
certainty that the information would become public.114 Dollar could
claim that he posted the lecture and comments on the school’s web page
intended only for the students; he in no way foresaw another student
taking it and disseminating it on-line. He will likely argue that the posting was not on a public website and should not constitute publicity.
Mayor Payoff will likely rely on Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P. to
show that his private information was posted on a publicly accessible
website.115 Payoff will argue that it matters not how many people heard
the lecture, but the fact that Dollar had posted it on a site where it was
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 42-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 43.
See R. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 552-53 (Minn. 2003).
Id. at 557-58.
Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 42-45 (Minn. 2009).
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accessed by many others and copied to other web sites constitutes a
publication.
Private Fact
A private fact is one that has not already been made public.116 Liability cannot be based upon that which the plaintiff himself leaves open
to the public eye.117 It also follows from the use of the term private fact
that the reader or recipient of the private fact not have prior knowledge
of that fact: there can be no liability where the publicity given involves
facts with which the recipient is familiar.118 Every individual has some
phases of his life and his activities and some facts about himself that he
does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at most
reveals only to his family or to close friends.119
Dollar will likely argue that Mayor Payoff is a public figure and his
actions while Mayor are of public concern.120 A public figure is defined
as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a “public personage.”121 To be included in this category are those who have achieved
some degree of reputation by appearing before the public.122 It includes
anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person.123 Mayor Payoff has done all these things and is a
public figure. Payoff clearly has arrived at a position where public attention is focused on him in the area of ethics and morality. He is pledging
his innocence in bribery charges and that he is not a criminal. He went
so far as to chastise other civil servants regarding theft.124 Thus, as a
public figure Payoff has lost, at least to facts relating to kleptomania and
theft, his right to privacy.125
Payoff is likely to argue that is privacy rights should not be violated
despite his public servant status. He will likely cite to the record and
116. Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
118. Harris, 483 A.2d at 1384.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) (Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a man’s life
in his home, and some of his past history that he would rather forget).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (1977).
121. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 85.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See R. at 4. Demoting a fire department captain to lieutenant for allowing firefighters to drive a fire truck to the grocery store citing theft of city owned fuel. Also police
officers who accept discounts for coffee and meals amounted to undue use of authority.
125. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 85.
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Gallela v. Onassis, which shows that even a highly popular former First
Lady of the United States maintains privacy rights despite her fame.126
He will likely argue that kleptomania is an unpleasant, disgraceful, and
humiliating illness and is a private fact according to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.127
Offensive and Objectionable to the Reasonable Person
Whether or not the publication was highly offensive to a reasonable
person, is a factual question usually left for a jury to decide.128
Dollar is likely to argue that the fact that Mayor Payoff is a kleptomaniac is not offensive or objectionable to the reasonable person. The
act itself is offensive, but the fact that Payoff has a mental disorder is
not. Dollar will likely cite to Nelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Authority, which found that oral disclosure of physician’s diagnosis with hepatitis C to hospital administrators did not constitute publication, and even
if hospital’s letter informing organization of health care professionals,
physician’s employer, of his diagnosis constituted a publication, the letter was not offensive to the reasonable health care professional.129 He
should argue that there is no stigma attached to people with mental illnesses or those who seek treatment for them. Payoff has inserted himself into the ethical and moral debate by chastising others while he
himself has been unethical while in office.
Payoff is likely to argue that he had no intention of bringing his
mental health issues to light. He might rely on Doe v. Mills.130 In Doe,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants publicized the fact that they
made a decision to have an abortion despite their intent to keep this matter “private and confidential.”131 They alleged further that the publicity
was highly offensive and was deliberately calculated to embarrass and
humiliate them.132 After being presented with these facts, the court
held that they could not say that a reasonable person would not be justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by such publicity, thus finding that the
“highly offensive” element was met.133 Payoff will argue that when compared to the case at hand it is clear the “highly offensive” element is met.
Similar to Jane Doe, he clearly intended to keep his mental health issues
private and confidential. He had told no one besides his attorney of his
problem and he refused to testify on his own behalf to keep the private
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

R. at 11; Gallela v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1973).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997).
Nelson v. Glynn-Brunswick Hosp. Auth., 571 S.E.2d 557, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id.
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matter from becoming public knowledge. Cases have recognized this fact
and have held that medical procedures such as abortion, and procedures
that involve personal choices with regard to medical treatment, are private matters.134 As illustrated by the court in Doe, publication of these
personal choices can be highly offensive, which can in turn lead to a successful invasion of privacy claim.135
Not of Legitimate Public Concern
The public has an interest in learning about the matters. When a
matter involved with claim for publication of private facts is a legitimate
matter of public concern there is no invasion of privacy.136
Dollar is likely to argue that the fact Payoff admitted to kleptomania
is a matter of public concern. Dollar will likely argue that Payoff voluntarily placed himself in the public eye when he became mayor and the
fact that he is a habitual thief is a matter of concern for the public at
large. The proper inquiry is to determine whether the disclosure at issue
is newsworthy. To support this contention, Dollar will likely cite to,
Shulman v. Group W Productions, where plaintiffs, who where victims in
a car accident, were filmed by the defendant production company at the
accident scene.137 In that case, the California Supreme Court ruled that
the video of the accident scene was a matter of public concern because
the content was newsworthy.138 Dollar will argue that he did not violate
the Marshall State Eavesdropping Statute, so the recording and revelation of Payoff’s kleptomania was legally obtained.139 Additionally,
whether the mayor steals is a matter of public concern because the electorate has the right to know whether an elected official is a thief.
Payoff is likely to argue that his kleptomania is not a matter of legitimate public concern. Payoff will argue that his kleptomania is an intensely private mental disorder for which he had been seeking
professional help. Furthermore, when the revelation was made, Payoff
he was no longer mayor. Payoff will likely argue that since he was no
longer in public office, his kleptomania is no longer a matter of public
concern. To support this, Payoff will cite to Virgil v. Time Inc., where a
surfer at first consented to a magazine article, but then later withdrew
134. Swickard v. Wayne Cnty. Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 314-15 (Mich. 1991).
135. Doe, 536 N.W.2d at 824; Swickard, 475 N.W.2d at 309-12.
136. See Cox Bd. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
137. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
138. Id. at 487 (“We agree with the defendants that the publication of truthful, lawfully
obtained material is a matter of legitimate public concern is constitutionally privileged and
does not create liability under the private facts tort.”).
139. The legal arguments of whether Dollar violated Marshall’s eavesdropping statute
are referenced above.
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his consent.140 In that case, the court noted that not every piece of information on every person will be considered of a legitimate public concern.
“The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say he had
no concern.”141 Payoff will argue that a reasonable person would say
they have no concern in the fact that he is a kleptomaniac because he is
no longer in public office and as such it does not affect the public at large.
Payoff will argue prying into his public life in such a way is just “morbid”
and “sensational.”
140. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
141. Id. at 1129 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. f (1977).).

